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ABSTRACT
Despite much effort, deep neural networks remain highly susceptible to tiny input
perturbations and even for MNIST, one of the most common toy datasets in com-
puter vision, no neural network model exists for which adversarial perturbations
are large and make semantic sense to humans. We show that even the widely
recognized and by far most successful defense by Madry et al. (1) overfits on
the L∞ metric (it’s highly susceptible to L2 and L0 perturbations), (2) classifies
unrecognizable images with high certainty, (3) performs not much better than
simple input binarization and (4) features adversarial perturbations that make little
sense to humans. These results suggest that MNIST is far from being solved in
terms of adversarial robustness. We present a novel robust classification model that
performs analysis by synthesis using learned class-conditional data distributions.
We derive bounds on the robustness and go to great length to empirically evaluate
our model using maximally effective adversarial attacks by (a) applying decision-
based, score-based, gradient-based and transfer-based attacks for several different
Lp norms, (b) by designing a new attack that exploits the structure of our defended
model and (c) by devising a novel decision-based attack that seeks to minimize
the number of perturbed pixels (L0). The results suggest that our approach yields
state-of-the-art robustness on MNIST against L0, L2 and L∞ perturbations and
we demonstrate that most adversarial examples are strongly perturbed towards the
perceptual boundary between the original and the adversarial class.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are strikingly susceptible to minimal adversarial perturbations
(Szegedy et al., 2013), perturbations that are (almost) imperceptible to humans but which can switch
the class prediction of DNNs to basically any desired target class. One key problem in finding
successful defenses is the difficulty of reliably evaluating model robustness. It has been shown time
and again (Athalye et al., 2018; Athalye & Carlini, 2018; Brendel & Bethge, 2017) that basically all
defenses previously proposed did not increase model robustness but prevented existing attacks from
finding minimal adversarial examples, the most common reason being masking of the gradients on
which most attacks rely. The few verifiable defenses can only guarantee robustness within a small
linear regime around the data points (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017; Raghunathan et al., 2018).
The only defense currently considered effective (Athalye et al., 2018) is a particular type of adversarial
training (Madry et al., 2018). On MNIST, as of today this method is able to reach an accuracy of
88.79% for adversarial perturbations with an L∞ norm bounded by  = 0.3 (Zheng et al., 2018). In
other words, if we allow an attacker to perturb the brightness of each pixel by up to 0.3 (range [0, 1]),
then he can only trick the model on≈ 10% of the samples. This is a great success, but does the model
really learn more causal features to classify MNIST? We here demonstrate that this is not the case:
For one, the defense by Madry et al. overfits on L∞ in the sense that adversarial perturbations in the
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L2 and L0 metric are as small as for undefended networks. Second, the robustness results by Madry
et al. can also be achieved with a simple input quantisation because of the binary nature of single
pixels in MNIST (which are typically either completely black or white) (Schmidt et al., 2018). Third,
it is straight-forward to find unrecognizable images that are classified as a digit with high certainty.
Finally, the minimum adversarial examples we find for the defense by Madry et al. make little to no
sense to humans.
Taken together, even MNIST cannot be considered solved with respect to adversarial robustness. By
“solved” we mean a model that reaches at least 99% accuracy (see accuracy-vs-robustness trade-off
(Gilmer et al., 2018)) and whose adversarial examples carry semantic meaning to humans (by which
we mean that they start looking like samples that could belong to either class). Hence, despite the
fact that MNIST is considered “too easy” by many and a mere toy example, finding adversarially
robust models on MNIST is still an open problem.
A potential solution we explore in this paper is inspired by unrecognizable images (Nguyen et al.,
2015) or distal adversarials. Distal adversarials are images that do not resemble images from the
training set but which typically look like noise while still being classified by the model with high
confidence. It seems difficult to prevent such images in feedforward networks as we have little control
over how inputs are classified that are far outside of the training domain. In contrast, generative
models can learn the distribution of their inputs and are thus able to gauge their confidence accordingly.
By additionally learning the image distribution within each class we can check that the classification
makes sense in terms of the image features being present in the input (e.g. an image of a bus should
contain actual bus features). Following this line of thought from an information-theoretic perspective,
one arrives at the well-known concept of Bayesian classifiers. We here introduce a fine-tuned variant
based on variational autoencoders (Kingma & Welling, 2013) that combines robustness with high
accuracy.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We show that MNIST is unsolved from the point of adversarial robustness: the SOTA defense of
Madry et al. (2018) is still highly vulnerable to tiny perturbations that are meaningless to humans.
• We introduce a new robust classification model and derive instance-specific robustness guarantees.
• We develop a strong attack that leverages the generative structure of our classification model.
• We introduce a novel decision-based attack that minimzes L0.
• We perform an extensive evaluation of our defense across many attacks to show that it surpasses
SOTA on L0, L2 and L∞ and features many adversarials that carry semantic meaning to humans.
We have evaluated the proposed defense to the best of our knowledge, but we are aware of the
(currently unavoidable) limitations of evaluating robustness. We will release the model architecture
and trained weights as a friendly invitation to fellow researchers to evaluate our model independently.
2 RELATED WORK
The many defenses against adversarial attacks can roughly be subdivided into four categories:
• Adversarial training: The training data is augmented with adversarial examples to make the
models more robust against them (Madry et al., 2018; Szegedy et al., 2013; Tramèr et al., 2017).
• Manifold projections: An input sample is projected onto a learned data manifold (Samangouei
et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2017; Shen et al., 2017; Song et al., 2018).
• Stochasticity: Certain inputs or hidden activations are shuffled or randomized (Prakash et al.,
2018; Dhillon et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018).
• Preprocessing: Inputs or hidden activations are quantized, projected into a different representation
or are otherwise preprocessed (Buckman et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018; Kabilan et al., 2018).
There has been much work showing that basically all defenses suggested so far in the literature do
not substantially increase robustness over undefended neural networks (Athalye et al., 2018; Brendel
& Bethge, 2017). The only noticeable exception according to Athalye et al. (2018) is the defense
by Madry et al. (2018) which is based on data augmentation with adversarials found by iterative
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Figure 1: Overview over model architecture. In a nutshell: I) for each sample x we compute a lower
bound on the log-likelihood (ELBO) under each class using gradient descent in the latent space. II) A
class-dependent scalar weighting of the class-conditional ELBOs forms the final class prediction.
projected gradient descent with random starting points. However, as we see in the results section,
this defense overfits on the metric it is trained on (L∞) and it is straight-forward to generate small
adversarial perturbations that carry little semantic meaning for humans.
Some other defenses have been based on generative models. Typically these defenses used the
generative model to project the input or the hidden activations onto the (learned) manifold of “natural”
inputs. This includes in particular DefenseGAN (Samangouei et al., 2018), Adversarial Perturbation
Elimination GAN (Shen et al., 2017) and Robust Manifold Defense (Ilyas et al., 2017), all of which
project an image onto the manifold defined by a generator network G. The generated image is then
classified by a discriminator in the usual way. A similar idea is used by PixelDefend (Song et al.,
2018) which use an autoregressive probabilistic method to learn the data manifold. Other ideas in
similar directions include the use of denoising autoencoders in (Gu & Rigazio, 2014) and (Liao et al.,
2017) as well as MagNets (Meng & Chen, 2017) (which projects or rejects inputs depending on
their distance to the data manifold). All of these proposed defenses have not been found effective,
see (Athalye et al., 2018). It is straight-forward to understand why: For one, many adversarials
still look like normal data points to humans. Second, the classifier on top of the projected image is
as vulnerable to adversarial examples as before. Hence, for any data set with a natural amount of
variation there will almost always be a certain perturbation against which the classifier is vulnerable
and which can be induced by the right inputs.
We here follow a different approach by modeling the input distribution within each class (instead
of modeling a single distribution for the complete data), and by classifying a new sample according
to the class under which it has the highest likelihood. This approach, commonly referred to as a
Bayesian classifier, gets away without any additional and vulnerable classifier.
3 MODEL DESCRIPTION
Intuitively, we want to learn a causal model of the inputs. Consider a cat: we want a model to learn
that cats have four legs and two pointed ears, and then use this model to check whether a given input
can be generated with these features. This intuition can be formalized as follows. Let (x, y) with
x ∈ RN be an input-label datum. Instead of directly learning a posterior p(y|x) from inputs to labels
we now learn generative distributions p(x|y) and classify new inputs using Bayes formula,
p(y|x) = p(x|y)p(y)
p(x)
∝ p(x|y)p(y). (1)
The label distribution p(y) can be estimated from the training data. To learn the class-conditional
sample distributions p(x|y) we use variational autoencoders (VAEs) (Kingma & Welling, 2013).
VAEs estimate the log-likelihood log p(x) by learning a probabilistic generative model pθ(x|z) with
latent variables z ∼ p(z) and parameters θ (see Appendix A.1 for the full derivation):
log pθ(x) ≥ Ez∼qφ(z|x) [log pθ(x|z)]−DKL [qφ(z|x)||p(z)] =: `y(x), (2)
where p(z) = N (0,1) is a simple normal prior and qφ(z|x) is the variational posterior with
parameters φ. The first term on the RHS is basically a reconstruction error while the second term
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on the RHS is the mismatch between the variational and the true posterior. The term on the RHS is
the so-called evidence lower bound (ELBO) on the log-likelihood (Kingma & Welling, 2013). We
implement the conditional distributions pθ(x|z) and qφ(z|x) as normal distributions for which the
means are parametrized as deep neural networks (all details and hyperparameters are reported in
Appendix A.5).
Our Analysis by Synthesis model (ABS) is illustrated in Figure 1. It combines several elements to
simultaneously achieve high accuracy and robustness against adversarial perturbations:
• Class-conditional distributions: For each class y we train a variational autoencoder VAEy on
the samples of class y to learn the class-conditional distribution p(x|y). This allows us to estimate
a lower bound `y(x) on the log-likelihood of sample x under each class y.
• Optimization-based inference: The variational inference qφ(z|x) is itself a neural network
susceptible to adversarial perturbations. We therefore only use variational inference during
training and perform “exact” inference over pθ(x|z) during evaluation. This “exact” inference
is implemented using gradient descent in the latent space (with fixed posterior width) to find the
optimal zy which maximizes the lower bound on the log-likelihood for each class:
`∗y(x) = max
z
log pθ(x|z)−DKL [N (z, σ1)||N (0,1)] . (3)
Note that we replaced the expectation in equation 2 with a maximum likelihood sample to avoid
stochastic sampling and to simplify optimization. To avoid local minima we evaluate 8000 random
points in the latent space of each VAE, from which we pick the best as a starting point for a
gradient descent with 50 iterations using the Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014).
• Classification and confidence: Finally, to perform the actual classification, we scale all `∗y(x)
with a factor α, exponentiate, add an offset η and divide by the total evidence (like in a softmax),
p(y|x) =
(
eα`
∗
y(x) + η
)
/
∑
c
(
eα`
∗
c(x) + η
)
. (4)
We introduced η for the following reason: even on points far outside the data domain, where
all likelihoods q(x, y) = eα`
∗
y(x) + η are small, the standard softmax (η = 0) can lead to sharp
posteriors p(y|x) with high confidence scores for one class. This behavior is in stark contrast
to humans, who would report a uniform distribution over classes for unrecognizable images.
To model this behavior we set η > 0: in this case the posterior p(y|x) converges to a uniform
distribution whenever the maximum q(x, y) gets small relative to η . We chose η such that the
median confidence p(y|x) is 0.9 for the predicted class on clean test samples. Furthermore, for
a better comparison with cross-entropy trained networks, the scale α is trained to minimize the
cross-entropy loss. We also tested this graded softmax in standard feedforward CNNs but did not
find any improvement with respect to unrecognizable images.
• Binarization (Binary ABS only): The pixel intensities of MNIST images are almost binary. We
exploit this by projecting the intensity b of each pixel to 0 if b < 0.5 or 1 if b ≥ 0.5 during testing.
• Discriminative finetuning (Binary ABS only): To improve the accuracy of the Binary ABS
model we multiply `∗y(x) with an additional class-dependent scalar γy. The scalars are learned
discriminatively (see A.5) and reach values in the range γy ∈ [0.96, 1.06] for all classes y.
4 TIGHT ESTIMATES OF THE LOWER BOUND FOR ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
The decision of the model depends on the likelihood in each class, which for clean samples is mostly
dominated by the posterior likelihood p(x|z). Because we chose this posterior to be Gaussian, the
class-conditional likelihoods can only change gracefully with changes in x, a property which allows
us to derive lower bounds on the model robustness. To see this, note that equation 3 can be written as,
`∗c(x) = max
z
−DKL [N (z, σ1)||N (0,1)]− 1
2σ2
‖Gc(z)− x‖22 + C, (5)
where we absorbed the normalization constants of p(x|z) into C and Gc(z) is the mean of p(x|z, c).
Let y be the ground-truth class and let z∗x be the optimal latent for the clean sample x for class y. We
can then estimate a lower bound on `∗y(x+ δ) for a perturbation δ with size  = ‖δ‖2 (see derivation
in Appendix A.2),
4
Preprint.
`∗y(x+ δ) ≥ `∗y(x)−
1
σ2
 ‖Gy(z∗x)− x‖2 −
1
2σ2
2 + C. (6)
Likewise, we can derive an upper bound of `∗y(x+ δ) for all other classes c 6= y (see Appendix A.3),
`∗c(x+ δ) ≤ −DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)] + C −
{
1
2σ2 (dc − )2 if dc ≥ 
0 else
. (7)
for dc = minz ‖Gc(z)− x‖2. Now we can find  for a given image x by equating (7) = (6),
x = min
c6=y
max
{
0,
dc + `
∗
y(x)−DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)]
2(dc + ‖Gy(z∗x)− x‖2)
}
. (8)
Note that one assumption we make is that we can find the global minimum of ‖Gc(z)− x‖22. In
practice we generally find a very tight estimate of the global minimum (and thus the lower bound)
because we optimize in a smooth and low-dimensional space and because we perform an additional
brute-force sampling step.
5 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Reliably evaluating model robustness is difficult because each attack only provides an upper bound
on the size of the adversarial perturbations (Uesato et al., 2018). To make this bound as tight
as possible we apply many different attacks and choose the best one for each sample and model
combination (using the implementations in Foolbox v1.3 (Rauber et al., 2017) which often perform
internal hyperparameter optimization). We also created a novel decision-based L0 attack as well as a
customized attack that specifically exploits the structure of our model. Nevertheless, we cannot rule
out that more effective attacks exist and we will release the trained model for future testing.
Latent Descent attack This novel attack exploits the structure of the ABS model. Let xt be the
perturbed sample x in iteration t. We perform variational inference p(z|xt, y) = N (µy(xt), σI) to
find the most likely class y˜ that is different from the ground-truth class. We then make a step towards
the maximum likelihood posterior p(x|z, y˜) of that class which we denote as x˜y˜ ,
xt 7→ (1− )xt + x˜y˜. (9)
We choose  = 10−2 and iterate until we find an adversarial. For a more precise estimate we perform
a subsequent binary search of 10 steps within the last  interval. Finally, we perform another binary
search between the adversarial and the original image to reduce the perturbation as much as possible.
Decision-based attacks We use several decision-based attacks because they do not rely on gradient
information and are thus insensitive to gradient masking or missing gradients. In particular, we
apply the Boundary Attack (Brendel et al., 2018), which is competitive with gradient-based attacks
in minimizing the L2 norm, and introduce the Pointwise Attack, a novel decision-based attack that
greedily minimizes the L0 norm. It first adds salt-and-pepper noise until the image is misclassified and
then repeatedly iterates over all perturbed pixels, resetting them to the clean image if the perturbed
image stays adversarial. The attack ends when no pixel can be reset anymore. We provide an
implementation of the attack in Foolbox (Rauber et al., 2017). Finally, we apply two simple noise
attacks, the Gaussian Noise attack and the Salt&Pepper Noise attack as baselines.
Transfer-based attacks Transfer attacks also don’t rely on gradients of the target model but instead
compute them on a substitute: given an input x we first compute adversarial perturbations δ on the
substitute using different gradient-based attacks (L2 and L∞ Basic Iterative Method (BIM), Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and L2 Fast Gradient Method) and then perform a line search to find
the smallest  for which x+ δ (clipped to the range [0, 1]) is still an adversarial for the target model.
Gradient-based attacks We apply the Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) (Dong et al., 2017) that
won the NIPS 2017 adversarial attack challenge, the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al.,
2016) (also known as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD))—for both the L2 and the L∞ norm—as
well as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and its L2 variant, the Fast
Gradient Method (FGM). For models with input binarization (Binary CNN, Binary ABS), we obtain
gradients using the straight-through estimator (Bengio et al., 2013).
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Figure 2: Accuracy-distortion plots for each distance metric and all models. In (b) we see that a
threshold at 0.3 favors Madry et al. while a threshold of 0.35 would have favored the Binary ABS.
Score-based attacks We additionally run all attacks listed under Gradient-based attacks using
numerically estimated gradients (possible for all models). We use a simple coordinate-wise finite
difference method (NES estimates (Ilyas et al., 2018) performed comparable or worse) and repeat the
attacks with different values for the step size of the gradient estimator.
Postprocessing (binary models only) For models with input binarization (see sec. 6) we postpro-
cess all adversarials by setting pixel intensities either to the corresponding value of the clean image or
the binarization threshold (0.5). This reduces the perturbation size without changing model decisions.
6 EXPERIMENTS
We compare our ABS model as well as two ablations—ABS with input binarization during test time
(Binary ABS) and a CNN with input binarization during train and test time (Binary CNN)—against
three other models: the SOTA L∞ defense (Madry et al., 2018)1, a Nearest Neighbour (NN) model
(as a somewhat robust but not accurate baseline) and a vanilla CNN (as an accurate but not robust
baseline), see Appendix A.5. We run all attacks (see sec. 5) against all applicable models.
For each model and Lp norm, we show how the accuracy of the models decreases with increasing
adversarial perturbation size (Figure 2) and report two metrics: the median adversarial distance
(Table 1, left values) and the model’s accuracy against bounded adversarial perturbations (Table 1,
right values). The median of the perturbation sizes (Table 1, left values) is robust to outliers and
summarizes most of the distributions quite well. It represents the perturbation size for which the
particular model achieves 50% accuracy and does not require the choice of a threshold. Clean samples
that are already misclassified are counted as adversarials with a perturbation size equal to 0, failed
attacks as∞. The commonly reported model accuracy on bounded adversarial perturbations, on the
other hand, requires a metric-specific threshold that can bias the results. We still report it (Table 1,
right values) for completeness and set L2 = 1.5, L∞ = 0.3 and L0 = 12 as thresholds.
7 RESULTS
Minimal Adversarials Our robustness evaluation results of all models are reported in Table 1 and
Figure 2. All models except the Nearest Neighbour classifier perform close to 99% accuracy on clean
test samples. We report results for three different norms: L2, L∞ and L0.
• For L2 our ABS model outperforms all other models by a large margin.
• For L∞, our Binary ABS model is state-of-the-art in terms of median perturbation size. In terms
of accuracy (perturbations < 0.3), Madry et al. seems more robust. However, as revealed by the
accuracy-distortion curves in Figure 2, this is an artifact of the specific threshold (Madry et al. is
optimized for 0.3). A slightly larger one (e.g. 0.35) would strongly favor the Binary ABS model.
1We used the trained model provided by the authors: https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
6
Preprint.
CNN BinaryCNN
Nearest
Neighbor
Madry
et al.
Binary
ABS ABS
Clean 99.1% 98.5% 96.9% 98.8% 99.0% 99.0%
L2-metric ( = 1.5)
Transfer Attacks 1.1 / 14% 1.4 / 38% 5.4 / 90% 3.7 / 94% 2.5 / 86% 4.6 / 94%
Gaussian Noise 5.2 / 96% 3.4 / 92% ∞ / 91% 5.4 / 96% 5.6 / 89% 10.9 / 98%
Boundary Attack 1.2 / 21% 3.3 / 84% 2.9 / 73% 1.4 / 37% 6.0 / 91% 2.6 / 83%
Pointwise Attack 3.4 / 91% 1.9 / 71% 3.5 / 89% 1.9 / 71% 3.1 / 87% 4.8 / 94%
FGM 1.4 / 48% 1.4 / 50% ∞ / 96%
FGM w/ GE 1.4 / 42% 2.8 / 51% 3.7 / 79% ∞ / 88% 1.9 / 68% 3.5 / 89%
DeepFool 1.2 / 18% 1.0 / 11% 9.0 / 91%
DeepFool w/ GE 1.3 / 30% 0.9 / 5% 1.6 / 55% 5.1 / 90% 1.4 / 41% 2.4 / 83%
L2 BIM 1.1 / 13% 1.0 / 11% 4.8 / 88%
L2 BIM w/ GE 1.1 / 37% ∞ / 50% 1.7 / 62% 3.4 / 88% 1.6 / 63% 3.1 / 87%
Latent Descent Attack 2.6 / 97% 2.7 / 85%
All L2 Attacks 1.1 / 8% 0.9 / 3% 1.5 / 53% 1.4 / 35% 1.3 / 39% 2.3 / 80%
L∞-metric ( = 0.3)
Transfer Attacks 0.08 / 0% 0.44 / 85% 0.42 / 78% 0.39 / 92% 0.49 / 88% 0.34 / 73%
FGSM 0.10 / 4% 0.43 / 77% 0.45 / 93%
FGSM w/ GE 0.10 / 21% 0.42 / 71% 0.38 / 68% 0.47 / 89% 0.49 / 85% 0.27 / 34%
L∞ DeepFool 0.08 / 0% 0.38 / 74% 0.42 / 90%
L∞ DeepFool w/ GE 0.09 / 0% 0.37 / 67% 0.21 / 26% 0.53 / 90% 0.46 / 78% 0.27 / 39%
BIM 0.08 / 0% 0.36 / 70% 0.36 / 90%
BIM w/ GE 0.08 / 37% ∞ / 70% 0.25 / 43% 0.46 / 89% 0.49 / 86% 0.25 / 13%
MIM 0.08 / 0% 0.37 / 71% 0.34 / 90%
MIM w/ GE 0.09 / 36% ∞ / 69% 0.19 / 26% 0.36 / 89% 0.46 / 85% 0.26 / 17%
All L∞ Attacks 0.08 / 0% 0.34 / 64% 0.19 / 22% 0.34 / 88% 0.44 / 77% 0.23 / 8%
L0-metric ( = 12)
Salt&Pepper Noise 44.0 / 91% 44.0 / 88% 161.0 / 88% 13.5 / 56% 158.5 / 96% 182.5 / 95%
Pointwise Attack 10x 9.0 / 19% 11.0 / 39% 10.0 / 34% 4.0 / 0% 36.5 / 82% 22.0 / 78%
All L0 Attacks 9.0 / 19% 11.0 / 38% 10.0 / 34% 4.0 / 0% 36.0 / 82% 22.0 / 78%
Table 1: Results for different models, adversarial attacks and distance metrics. Each entry shows the
median adversarial distance across all samples (left value, black) as well as the model’s accuracy
against adversarial perturbations bounded by the thresholds L2 = 1.5, L∞ = 0.3 and L0 = 12
(right value, gray). “w/ GE” indicates attacks that use numerical gradient estimation.
• For L0, both ABS and Binary ABS are much more robust than all other models. Interestingly, the
model by Madry et al. is the least robust, even less than the baseline CNN.
In Figure 3 we show adversarial examples. For each sample we show the minimally perturbed L2
adversarial found by any attack. Adversarials for the baseline CNN and the Binary CNN are almost
imperceptible. The Nearest Neighbour model, almost by design, exposes (some) adversarials that
interpolate between two numbers. The model by Madry et al. requires perturbations that are clearly
visible but make little semantic sense to humans. Finally, adversarials generated for the ABS models
are semantically meaningful for humans and are sitting close to the perceptual boundary between the
original and the adversarial class. For a more thorough comparison see appendix Figures 5, 6 and 7.
Lower bounds on Robustness For the ABS models and the L2 metric we estimate a lower bound
of the robustness. The lower bound for the mean perturbation2 for the MNIST test set is  =
0.690±0.005 for the ABS and  = 0.601±0.005 for the binary ABS. We estimated the error by using
different random seeds for our optimization procedure and standard error propagation over 10 runs.
2The mean instead of the median is reported to allow for a comparison with (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017).
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Figure 3: Adversarial examples for the ABS models are perceptually meaningful: For each sample
(randomly chosen from each class) we show the minimally perturbed L2 adversarial found by any
attack. Our ABS models have clearly visible and often semantically meaningful adversarials. Madry
et al. requires perturbations that are clearly visible, but their semantics are less clear.
With adversarial training Hein & Andriushchenko (2017) achieve a mean L2 robustness guarantee
of  = 0.48 while reaching 99% accuracy. In the Linf metric we find a median robustness of 0.06.
Figure 4: Images
of ones classified
with a probability
above 90%.
Distal Adversarials We probe the behavior of CNN, Madry et al. and our
ABS model outside the data distribution. We start from random noise images and
perform gradient ascent to maximize the output probability of a fixed label such
that p(y|x) ≥ 0.9 of the modified softmax from equation (8). The results are
visualized in Figure 4. Standard CNNs and Madry et al. provide high confidence
class probabilities for unrecognizable images. Our ABS model does not provide
high confident predictions in out of distribution regions.
8 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this paper we demonstrated that, despite years of work, we as a community
failed to create neural networks that can be considered robust on MNIST from
the point of human perception. In particular, we showed that even today’s
best defense overfits the L∞ metric and is susceptible to small adversarial
perturbations that make little to no semantic sense to humans. We presented a
new approach based on analysis by synthesis that seeks to explain its inference
by means of the actual image features. We performed an extensive analysis to
show that minimal adversarial perturbations in this model are large across all
tested Lp norms and semantically meaningful to humans.
We acknowledge that it is not easy to reliably evaluate a model’s adversarial
robustness and most defenses proposed in the literature have later been shown
to be ineffective. In particular, the structure of the ABS model prevents the
computation of gradients which might give the model an unfair advantage. We
put a lot of effort into an extensive evaluation of adversarial robustness using a
large collection of powerful attacks, including one specifically designed to be
particularly effective against the ABS model (the Latent Descent attack), and we
will release the model architecture and trained weights as a friendly invitation
to fellow researchers to evaluate our model.
Looking at the results of individual attacks (Table 1) we find that there is no
single attack that works best on all models, thus highlighting the importance for a broad range of
attacks. Without the Boundary Attack, for example, Madry et al. would have looked more robust to
L2 adversarials than it is. For similar reasons Figure 6b of Madry et al. (2018) reports a median L2
perturbation size larger than 5, compared to the 1.4 achieved by the Boundary Attack. Moreover,the
combination of all attacks of one metric (All L2 / L∞ / L0 Attacks) is often better than any individual
attack, indicating that different attacks are optimal on different samples.
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The naive implementation of the ABS model with one VAE per class neither scales efficiently to more
classes nor to more complex datasets (a preliminary experiment on CIFAR10 provided only 54% test
accuracy). However, there are many ways in which the ABS model can be improved, ranging from
better and faster generative models (e.g. flow-based) to better training procedures.
In a nutshell, we demonstrated that MNIST is still not solved from the point of adversarial robustness
and showed that our novel approach based on analysis by synthesis has great potential to reduce the
vulnerability against adversarial attacks and to align machine perception with human perception.
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A APPENDIX
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Figure 5: L0 error quantiles: We always choose the minimally perturbed L0 adversarial found by
any attack for each model. For an unbiased selection, we then randomly sample images within four
error quantiles (0− 25%, 25− 50%, 50− 75%, and 75− 100%). Where 100% corresponds to the
maximal (over samples) minimum (over attacks) perturbation found for each model.
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Figure 6: L2 error quantiles: We always choose the minimally perturbed L2 adversarial found by any
attack for each model. For an unbiased selection, we then randomly sample 4 images within four
error quantiles (0− 25%, 25− 50%, 50− 75%, and 75− 100%).
12
Preprint.
1
.Q
u
a
n
ti
le
CNN
6→85→3
4→91→2
2
.Q
u
a
n
ti
le
6→82→7
9→40→9
3
.Q
u
a
n
ti
le
7→38→2
0→93→9
4
.Q
u
a
n
ti
le
8→96→4
5→86→0
Binary
CNN
4→19→5
4→64→9
1→72→3
0→78→5
0→69→4
1→88→9
4→81→8
1→85→3
Nearest
Neighbor
5→75→3
4→65→3
0→73→5
5→86→0
9→48→3
4→93→5
0→56→2
2→10→6
Madry
et al.
5→37→9
4→60→4
4→98→3
1→48→7
0→61→8
2→36→0
6→40→6
2→12→3
Binary
ABS
3→55→9
4→94→9
0→93→5
3→76→4
2→19→7
0→91→4
1→47→5
2→15→2
ABS
5→39→4
7→95→9
8→26→8
3→20→4
0→93→5
3→21→2
0→90→3
6→80→9
Figure 7: L∞ error quantiles: We always choose the minimally perturbed L∞ adversarial found by
any attack for each model. For an unbiased selection, we then randomly sample images within four
error quantiles (0− 25%, 25− 50%, 50− 75%, and 75− 100%).
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Figure 8: Distribution of minimal adversarials for each model and distance metric. In (b) we see that
a threshold at 0.3 favors Madry et al. while a threshold of 0.35 would have favored the Binary ABS.
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A.1 DERIVATION I
Derivation of the ELBO in equation 2.
log pθ(x) = log
∫
dz pθ(x|z)p(z),
where p(z) = N (0,1) is a simple normal prior. Based on the idea of importance sampling using a variational
posterior qφ(z|x) with parameters φ and using Jensen’s inequality we arrive at
= log
∫
dz
qφ(z|x)
qφ(z|x)pθ(x|z)p(z),
= logEz∼qφ(z|x)
[
pθ(x|z)p(z)
qφ(z|x)
]
,
≥ Ez∼qφ(z|x)
[
log
pθ(x|z)p(z)
qφ(z|x)
]
,
= Ez∼qφ(z|x)
[
log pθ(x|z) + log p(z)
qφ(z|x)
]
,
= Ez∼qφ(z|x) [log pθ(x|z)]−DKL [qφ(z|x)||p(z)] .
This lower bound is commonly referred to as ELBO.
A.2 DERIVATION II: LOWER BOUND FOR L2 ROBUSTNESS ESTIMATION
Derivation of equation 6. Starting from equation 3 we find that for a perturbation δ with size  = ‖δ‖2 of sample
x the lower bound `∗y(x+ δ) can itself be bounded by,
`∗y(x+ δ) = max
z
−DKL [N (z, σq1)||N (0,1)]− 1
2σ2
‖Gy(z)− x− δ‖22 + C,
≥ −DKL [N (z∗x, σq1)||N (0,1)]− 1
2σ2
‖Gy(z∗x)− x− δ‖22 + C,
where z∗x is the optimal latent vector for the clean sample x for class y,
= `∗y(x) +
1
σ2
δ>(Gy(z
∗
x)− x)− 1
2σ2
2 + C,
≥ `∗y(x)− 1
σ2
 ‖Gy(z∗x)− x‖2 −
1
2σ2
2 + C. (10)
A.3 DERIVATION III: UPPER BOUND FOR L2 ROBUSTNESS ESTIMATION
Derivation of equation 7.
`∗c(x+ δ) = max
z
−DKL [N (z, σq1)||N (0,1)]− 1
2σ2
‖Gy(z)− x− δ‖22 + C,
≤ −DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)] + C −min
z
1
2σ2
‖Gc(z)− x− δ‖22 ,
≤ −DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)] + C −min
z,δ
1
2σ2
‖Gc(z)− x− δ‖22 ,
= −DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)] + C −
{
1
2σ2
(dc − )2 if dc ≥ 
0 else
. (11)
for dc = minz ‖Gc(z)− x‖2. The last equation comes from the solution of the constrained optimization
problem mind(d − )2d s.t. d > dc. Note that a tighter bound might be achieved by assuming single δ for
upper and lower bound.
A.4 L∞ ROBUSTNESS ESTIMATION
We proceed in the same way as for L2. Starting again from
`∗c(x) = max
z
−DKL [N (z, σ1)||N (0,1)]− 1
2σ2
‖Gc(z)− x‖22 + C, (12)
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let y be the predicted class and let z∗x be the optimal latent for the clean sample x for class y. We can then
estimate a lower bound on `∗y(x+ δ) for a perturbation δ with size  = ‖δ‖∞,
`∗y(x+ δ) = max
z
−DKL [N (z, σq1)||N (0,1)]− 1
2σ2
‖Gy(z)− x− δ‖22 + C,
≥ −DKL [N (z∗x, σq1)||N (0,1)]− 1
2σ2
‖Gy(z∗x)− x− δ‖22 + C,
where z∗x is the optimal latent for the clean sample x for class y.
= `∗y(x) +
1
σ2
δ>(Gy(z
∗
x)− x)− 1
2σ2
‖δ‖22 + C,
≥ `∗y(x) + C + 1
2σ2
min
δ
(
2δ>(Gy(z
∗
x)− x)− ‖δ‖22
)
,
= `∗y(x) + C +
1
2σ2
∑
i
min
δi
(
2δi[Gy(z
∗
x)− x]i − δ2i
)
,
= `∗y(x) + C +
1
2σ2
∑
i
{
[Gy(z
∗
x)− x]2i if |[Gy(z∗x)− x]i| ≤ 
 |[Gy(z∗x)− x]i| else . (13)
Similarly, we can estimate an upper bound on `∗c(x+ δ) on all other classes c 6= y,
`∗c(x+ δ) ≤ −DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)] + C −min
z
1
2σ2
‖Gc(z)− x− δ‖22 ,
≤ −DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)] + C −min
z,δ
1
2σ2
‖Gc(z)− x− δ‖22 ,
= −DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)] + C −min
z
1
2σ2
∑
i
min
δi
([Gc(z)− x]i − δi)2 ,
= −DKL [N (0, σq1)||N (0,1)] + C
−min
z
1
2σ2
∑
i

0 if |[Gy(z∗x)− x]i| ≤ 
([Gy(z
∗
x)− x]i − )2 if [Gy(z∗x)− x]i > 
([Gy(z
∗
x)− x]i + )2 if [Gy(z∗x)− x]i < 
.
(14)
In this case there is no closed-form solution for the minimization problem on the RHS (in terms of the minimum
of ‖Gc(z)− x‖2) but we can still compute the solution for each given  which allows us perform a line search
along  to find the point where equation 13 = equation 14.
A.5 MODEL & TRAINING DETAILS
Hyperparameters and training details for the ABS model The binary ABS and ABS have the same
weights and architecture: The encoder has 4 layers with kernel sizes= [5, 4, 3, 5], strides= [1, 2, 2, 1] and feature
map sizes= [32, 32, 64, 2∗8]. The first 3 layers have ELU activation functions (Clevert et al., 2015), the last layer
is linear. All except the last layer use Batch Normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015). The Decoder architecture
has also 4 layers with kernel sizes= [4, 5, 5, 3], strides= [1, 2, 2, 1] and feature map sizes= [32, 16, 16, 1]. The
first 3 layers have ELU activation functions, the last layer has a sigmoid activation function, and all layers except
the last one use Batch Normalization.
We trained the VAEs with the Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014). We tuned the dimension L of the latent
space of the class-conditional VAEs (ending up with L = 8) to achieve 99% test error; started with a high weight
for the KL-divergence term at the beginning of training (which was gradually decreased from a factor of 10 to 1
over 50 epochs); estimated the weighting γ = [1, 0.96, 1.001, 1.06, 0.98, 0.96, 1.03, 1, 1, 1] of the lower bound
via a line search on the training accuracy. The parameters maximizing the test cross entropy3 and providing a
median confidence of p(y|x) = 0.9 for our modified softmax (equation 8) are η = 0.000039 and α = 440.
Hyperparameters for the CNNs The CNN and Binary CNN share the same architecture but have dif-
ferent weights. The architecture has kernel sizes = [5, 4, 3, 5], strides = [1, 2, 2, 1], and feature map sizes
= [20, 70, 256, 10]. All layers use ELU activation functions and all layers except the last one apply Batch
Normalization. The CNNs are both trained on the cross entropy loss with the Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba,
2014). The parameters maximizing the test cross entropy and providing a median confidence of p(y|x) = 0.9 of
the CNN for our modified softmax (equation 8) are η = 143900 and α = 1.
3Note that this solely scales the probabilities and does not change the classification accuracy.
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Hyperparameters for Madry et al. We adapted the pre-trained model provided by Madry et al4. Basi-
cally the architecture contains two convolutional, two pooling and two fully connected layers. The network is
trained on clean and adversarial examples minimizing the cross cross-entropy loss. The parameters maximizing
the test cross entropy and providing a median confidence of p(y|x) = 0.9 for our modified softmax (equation 8)
are η = 60 and α = 1.
Hyperparameters for the Nearest Neighbour classifier For a comparison with neural networks, we
imitate logits by replacing them with the negative minimal distance between the input and all samples within each
class. The parameters maximizing the test cross entropy and providing a median confidence of p(y|x) = 0.9 for
our modified softmax (equation 8) are η = 0.000000000004 and α = 5.
4https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
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